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Lorentz: Classification Problems with Daily and Seasonal Commuters.

STATUTE NOTE
ALIENS-Immigration And Nationality ActClassification Problems With Daily
And Seasonal Commuters
8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1970).
Aliens who cross the border to work in the United States on either a
daily or seasonal basis are referred to as "commuters." While there is no
specific statutory classification of the commuter's status under the Immigration and Nationality Act,' he has been considered as falling into the category of an immigrant lawfully admitted for permanent residence or a "resident alien."' 2 Every alien, commuter or not, who enters the United States
for the first time must meet certain preliminary requirements in order to
qualify as an immigrant. If these criteria are met, the alien is classified
as a resident alien and an immigration visa is issued. 3 In order to retain
that status, the statute requires the alien to establish a permanent residence
within the United States boundaries-as most resident aliens do.4 But because a commuter's real home is across the border, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) has created an "amiable fiction" of equating
the commuter's place of employment with his residence.3 The commuter,
thus, makes a temporary visit abroad when he returns to his true home
across the border. During his journey to work, he is treated by the INS
as a resident alien "returning from a temporary visit abroad" 6 and is therefore not required to apply for a new immigration visa each time he crosses
7
the border.
1. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1970).

See In re

M-D--S---, 8 1. & N. Dec. 209, 213 (1958).

2. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (1970).
3. A border-crossing card is also issued to facilitate frequent travel across the border. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(6) (1970).
4. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(33) (1970).
5. In re Hoffman-Arvayo, 13 I. & N. Dec. 750, 752 (1971). Since the commuter
status depends on continued employment in the United States, it has been declared that

interruption of such employment for a period of 6 months will terminate that status.
In re Burciaga-Salcedo, 11 I. & N. Dec. 665, 667 (1966).

In addition, this amiable

fiction has not been deemed to qualify a commuter for naturalization benefits, which
depend on actual residence in the United States for prescribed periods following lawful
admission for permanent residence. In re Barron, 26 F.2d 106, 108 (E.D. Mich.
1928): Petition of Correa, 79 F. Supp. 265, 268 (W.D. Tex. 1948).
6. 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(27)(B) (1970).
7. Because they have been previously admitted to lawful residence in this coun-
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One of the basic reasons for creating the immigration acts is to protect
American labor from foreign competition," but there are intentional loopholes to allow for limited entry of aliens. The purposes of these loopholes.
are twofold: first, to allow for entry of persons such as visiting university
professors and scientists,O and second, to help preserve friendly relations with
foreign countries. 10 Mexican and Canadian nationals especially have enjoyed relatively unrestricted entry under this latter policy.
Recent efforts to organize farm laborers and industrial workers along the
borders have brought charges from unoins that commuters are strikebreakers,
and thus hinder unionization. These accusations have resulted in increased
efforts by various labor groups to control or eliminate the supply of alien
laborers in the western United States, causing the entire commuter system
to come under close scrutiny. Not only has Congress been lobbied to legislate the commuter out of existence, 1 ' but suits have been brought in federal
courts attacking the validity of the amiable fiction u-ed by the INS to clas2
sify daily and seasonal commuters as returning resident liens.1
Since Congress has the authority to regulate the entry of aliens into this
country, the critical inquiry at this point becomes one of determining the
legislative intent of the various statutes that affect commuters. Because the
Immigration and Nationality Act does not deal directly with the question
of either daily or seasonal commuters and there is no specific statutory category defining them, an understanding of the commuter's peculiar status must
be extrapolated from legislative history, administrative rulings and judicial
decisions.
For generations, citizens of foreign contiguous territory have been able
to travel to the United States to work free from all quota restrictions. 1 3 Prior
to the passage of the Immigration Act of 1924,'14 these persons were admitted as visitors coming to the United States temporarily for business or
try, returning resident aliens are relieved of many of the reentry documentation requirements demanded of other immigrants pu.suant to 8 U.S.C. § 1181(b)

(1970), which

states in part that, "[returning resident aliens] who are otherwise admissible may be
re-admitted to the United States by the Attorney General in his discretion without being required to obtain a passport, immigration visa, reentry permit or other documentation." 8 C.F.R. § 211.1(b)(1) (1972) executes this section of the statue by proviiding
for the use of Form 1-151 ("green cards") in lieu of passports or other documents.
8. See Karnuth v. United States ex rel. Albro, 279 U.S. 231, 243 (1929).
9. 8 U.S.C. § 1l01(a)(15)(J) (1970).
10. In re L-, 4 I. & N. Dec. 454, 456 (1951) (Editor's note).
11. See generally Hearings on H.R. 12667 Before the Special Subcomm. on Labor
of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 72-73 (1969).
12. E.g., Bustos v. Mitchell, 481 F.2d 479, 484 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. granted,
42 U.S.L.W. 3400 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1974) (No. 300); Gooch v. Clark, 433 F.2d 74, 78

(9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 995 (1971).
13. Bustos v. Mitchell, 481 F.2d 479, 485 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 42
U.S.L.W. 3400 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1974) (No. 300).

14. Immigration Art of 1924, W.. 190, 43 Stat. 153 [hereinafter cited as 1924
Art].
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pleasure.' 5 The 1924 Act classified all arriving aliens as immigrants unless
they fell into one of several designated groups described as nonimmigrants,
such as tourists and temporary business visitors. 16 This classification was
designed to insure that all aliens would be subject to the quota restrictions
imposed for their respective countries. Commuters, however, remained in
the nonimmigrant category of temporary business visitor, and thus were not
17
subject to the quota limitations which had been instituted by the 1924 Act.
Aliens other than Mexican and Canadian nationals (who had no quota
restrictions)'" soon discovered that if they were excluded as immigrants from
countries whose quotas were filled they could enter the United States as
a commuter under the nonimmigrant, temporary business visitor category.
Once inside the United States borders, these aliens simply disappeared into
the American melting pot. In response to this problem, the Department
of Labor in 1927 issued General Order 86 wherein it was administratively
decided that under the 1924 Act a commuter must be considered an immigrant.' 9 Each commuter was thereafter subject to the quota limitations
established for his native country upon entering the United States for the
first time. Once admitted as an immigrant, the commuter was considered
a resident alien who was allowed temporary visits abroad under the nonquota immigrant category. 20 Though not subject to quota limitations, Mexican and Canadian nationals were nevertheless required to apply for immigrant status if they were commuters. 21 By transferring commuters from the
temporary business visitor to the resident alien category, even though they
had no intention of establishing permanent residence in the United States,
General Order 86 provided a solution to the problem of quota evasion while
not disturbing the commuter system which had evolved along the Mexican
and Canadian borders.
General Order 86 remained the basis for the administrative handling of
22
commuters even after the passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act,
the basic statute still in effect today. The new act was both a consolidation
and comprehensive revision of previous immigration law. The sections in
15. Immigration Act of 1921, ch. 8, § 2(a), 42 Stat. 5. Pursuant to the Immigration Act, May 1, 1917, ch. 29, H9 3 and 23, 39 Stat. 875, identification cards were
issued for the use of those who habitually crossed the border.
16. 1924 Act, § 3.
17. 1924 Act, § 4(b).
18. 1924 Act, § 4(c).
19. Department of Labor, General Order 86 (April 1,1927), reprinted in (1927)
1 FOREIGN REL.

UNITED STATES

494-95 (1942).

20. The legality of General Order 86 was challenged by some of the aliens involved, but the Supreme Court, in Karnuth v. United States ex rel. Albro, 279 U.S.
231 (1929), is considered to have sustained the government's contention that aliens
coming to this country for employment cannot be considered temporary business visitors. In re M-D-S--, 8 I. & N. Dec. 209, 212 (1958).
....
.2 1. Id . a t ,2 12.

22. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ "l10i-1503 (1970).
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the 1924 Act which concerned commuters, however, underwent only minor
changes. 23 During the formulation of the Immigration and Nationality Act,
with the exception of a few comments in committee reports, 24 there was
virtually no congressional discussion of commuters and their status as resident aliens. This congressional silence, coupled with the lack of any substantive changes in the statute, led the INS to conclude that its handling
of commuters was unaffected by the Immigration and Nationality Act. 25
The INS discussed the administrative handling of commuters in light of
the Immigration and Nationality Act in the case of In re H_
0_20
In that case a border officer attempted to deny entry to a commuter on
the grounds that he did not qualify as a resident alien under the new statute.
In holding that a commuter's status was not affected by the Immigration
and Nationality Act, the Immigration Board of Appeals pointed out that
the Act merely incorporated from previous immigration acts and adninistrafive regulations that which was already in existence. 27 Therefore, the Board
concluded that it could not be inferred, without clear statutory language to
the contrary, that Congress intended a mandatory change in the commuter
status.

28

23. The Immigration and Nationality Act originally stated: "The term 'non-quota
immigrant' means-an immigrant, lawfully admitted for permanent residence, who is returning from a temporary visit abroad .... ." Ch. 477, § 101(a)(27)(B), 66 Stat. 183.
A 1965 amendment substituted the term "special immigrant" for non-quota immigrant.
8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(27)(B) (1970). The equivalent language of the 1924 Act, at section 4(b) was: "When used in this Act the term 'non-quota immigrant' means-an immigrant previously lawfully admitted to the United States, who is returning from a temporary visit abroad."
24.

SENATE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,

THE IMMIGRATION

AND

NATURALIZA-

S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.(1950)
wherein it was mentioned that "[Nonresident alien border-crossing cards] will not be
issued to . . . aliens who have been admitted into the United States for permanent residence. Aliens in the last category who cross the borders frequently are known as
commuters and are not nonimmigrants and they must apply for resident alien's bordercrossing cards .... "Id. at 616. Additional mention of commuters in the report included:
A resident alien's border-crossing identification card is a document which may
be issued to (1) a lawfully resident alien who wishes to, visit Canada or Mexico
(2) an alien who has been admitted for lawful permanent residence but who.
resides in foreign contiguous territory and is employed in the United States, the
so-called commuter.
Id. at 535.
25. As stated in In re H--O-, 5 I. & N. Dec. 716 (1954):
It is therefore concluded that the practice of considering commuters as permanent residents has not been disturbed by the Act of 1952, b t rather it,*has:
impliedly received congressional approval, since the legislative history of the act
reveals a discusion [sic] without dissent. Without clear statutory' anguge.,requir'ing a mandatory change in the commuter scheme, the law cannot be cohitrud
as prohibiting this procedure.
Id. at 718-19.
26. 5 I. & N. Dec. 716 (1954).
27. Id. at 717-18.
28. Id. at 718-19.
TION SYSTEMS OF THE UNITED STATES,
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In keeping with its protectionist policy of American labor, Congress added
a new mechanism to the Immigration and Nationality Act-the labor certification procedure. This procedure enabled the Attorney General to exclude, under certain conditions, otherwise qualified aliens. 29 If the alien
applied for immigration status, but the Secretary of Labor determined that
there were sufficient workers in the applicant's field of work and that his
admission would adversely affect the labor market, the statute declared that
alien to be ineligible for entry and thus excluable by the Attorney Gen30
eral.
In a 1960 decision, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Rogers,31 a federal
district court was confronted with the problem of whether a daily commuter
was subject to the labor certification provision. The union was engaged
in a strike at a meat packing plant in El Paso, Texas. In accordance with
the requirements of the labor certification provision then in effect, the union
sought and obtained from the Secretary of Labor a certification that admission of aliens would adversely affect the wages and working conditions at
the meat packing plant. The union then brought suit to enjoin the INS from
admitting commuters during the strike. The court held that since commuters did not actually reside in the United States, they could not be returning
32
resident aliens, notwithstanding the "amiable fiction" used by the INS.
Therefore, the labor certification procedure was to be applied to commuters.
Realizing that this decision jeopardized the existence of the commuter system, the INS distinguished Rogers in a subsequent ruling by limiting the de33
cision only to situations where a labor certification had been issued.
Like previous acts, the Immigration and Nationality Act does not directly
approach the question of distinguishing daily and seasonal commuters. Until
recently, however, the problem of the seasonal commuter was relatively nonexistent. The seasonal commuter was born in 1943 when, due to the unusual farm labor shortage caused by World War II, the United States and
Mexico entered into an agreement calling for the temporary migration of
34
Mexican workers for the purpose of providing needed agricultural laborers.
This came to be known as the Bracero program. After the war, Congress
29. Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, § 212(a)(14), 66 Stat. 183, as
amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14) (1970).
30. A later amendment now places the burden on the potential immigrant to show
that he will not adversely affect local labor conditions as an entry requirement. Act
of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. 89-236, § 10(a), 79 Stat. 917.
31. 186 F. Supp. 114 (D.D.C. 1960).
32. Id. at 118, 119. The court agreed that the labor certification did not apply
to resident aliens who permanently reside in the United States, but it found that commuters did not fall within that class. Id. at 119-20.
33. In re J-P-,
9 1. & N. Dec. 591 (1962).

34. Agreement with Mexico Respecting the Temporary Migration of Mexican Agricultural Workers, August 4, 1942, 56 Stat. 1759 (English summary at 56 Stat. 1763).
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continued the Bracero program under the Agricultural Act of 19493 5 by giving the Secretary of Labor the authority to supply agricultural workers from
Mexico "for the purpose of assisting in such production of agricultural products as the Secretary of Labor deems necessary."'36 When the Immigration
and Nationality Act went into effect, the Bracero was classified in the new
category of nonimmigrant coming to the United States to perform temporary services or labor. 37 The program was allowed to lapse in 1964, however, apparently due to pressure from American labor. 38
Further action by Congress, which points to its recognition of the seasonal
commuter problem, came the very next year when a substantial change was
made in the labor certification procedure. The present provision establishes
a status quo that requires the Attorney General to exclude all aliens as immigrants unless the Secretary of Labor finds there are not sufficient American
workers and that their admission would not adversely affect the labor market.3 9 In addition, the new procedure specifically requires that persons born
in the Western Hemisphere obtain a labor certification before becoming eligible to be classified as resident aliens even though such persons are not subject to quota restrictions. 40 The reason given for this change is found in
the Senate report which explained the bill before it was passed:
The bill specifically provides that skilled or unskilled labor of the temunder
porary or seasonal nature is not to be entitled to any preference
41
the selection system for the allocation of immigration visas.
It is clear that the seasonal commuter status under the Bracero program,
35. Agricultural Act of 1949, ch. 792, title V, §§ 501-510, 63 Stat. 1051, as added
July 12, 1951, ch. 223, 65 Stat. 119.
36. Id.§ 501.
37. THE SENATE COMMITrEE ON THE JUDICIARY, THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SYSTEMS OF THE UNITED STATES, S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950)

recommended "that provision should be made in permanent legislation which would
permit the admission of temporary agricultural labor in a nonimmigrant classification
when like labor cannot be found in this country." Id. at 586. In explaining the new
category, the House Report stated, "These provisions of the bill grant the Attorney

General sufficient authority to admit temporarily certain alien workers, industrial, agri-

cultural, or otherwise, for the purpose of alleviating labor shortages as they exist or
may develop in certain areas .... ." HOUSE COMMITrEE ON THE JUDICIARY, THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION ACT, H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 44-45

(1952).

38. See Agricultural Act of 1949, ch. 792, Title V, § 510, 63 Stat. 1051, as added
July 12, 1951, ch. 223, 65 Stat. 119, as amended Act of Dec. 13, 1963, Pub. L. No.
88-203, 77 Stat. 363 (1964).
39. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14) (1970), formerly ch. 477, § 212(a)(14), 66 Stat. 183.
The prior statute provided for admission of allimmigrant laborers unless detriment to
American labor was shown.
40. Id. An alien born inthe Western Hemisphere must now obtain a labor certification before receiving resident alien status. However, those commuters who received
resident alien status before 1965 are unaffected, having already been admitted.
41. SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, THE IMMIGRATION
ACT, S.REP. No. 748, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1965).

AND

NATURALIZA-

TION
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once a necessary aspect of American agricultural economic health, was deliberately terminated and that safeguards were then instituted to protect
42
American labor from foreign job competition.
The difference between daily and seasonal commuters did not come to
the attention of the courts until Gooch v. Clark43 when for the first time
the entire commuter system was attacked. 4 4 The distinction between daily
and seasonal commuters, however, was not dealt with in depth and both
types were treated as one class. In Gooch, farm workers brought suit seeking an order directing the INS to deny admission to all alien commuters.
The plaintiffs contended that commuters, not bona fide residents of the
United States, lost their status as resident aliens and hence, were no longer
entitled to reenter the United States as returning resident aliens. 45 The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the INS policy of admitting
all commuters as resident aliens was valid even though the commuter did
not actually reside in the United States. 46 Relying on the definition of resident alien, the court said that the "definition refers not to the actuality of
one's residence but to one's status under the immigration laws."' 47 Thus,
having been accorded the privilege of permanently residing in the United
States, it mattered not whether the commuter chose to exercise that privilege.45 Because the decision was based on the conclusion that all commuters
are lawfully resident aliens returning from a temporary visit abroad, 49 the
possibility that the granting of resident alien status to seasonal commuters
42. It was only after the termination of the Bracero program that the INS began
treating seasonal commuters as resident aliens. See Statement by James S. Hennessy,
Executive Assistant to the Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Hearings on H.R. 12667, Employment of "Green Card" Aliens During Labor Disputes Before the Special Subcommittee on Labor of the House Committee on Education
and Labor, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 73 (1969).
43. 433 F.2d 74 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 995 (1971).
44. Actually, the first attack on the commuter system took place in Texas State
AFL-CIO v. Kennedy, 330 F.2d 217 (D.C. Cir. 1964), but the case was dismissed for
lack of standing. Due to the later Supreme Court decisions in Data Processing Serv.
Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970) and Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159
(1970) standing was no longer an obstacle for Unions.
45. This contention is buttressed by 8 C.F.R. 211.1(b)(1) (1972) which states
that a border crossing identification card may be issued to "an immigrant alien returning to an unrelinquished lawful permanent residence in the United States .... "
46. Gooch v. Clark, 433 F.2d 74, 79 (9th Cir. 1970) cert. denied, 402 U.S. 955
(1971).
47. Id. at 79. This same argument was used by the INS in In re H-O-, 5 I.
& N. Dec. 716, 718 (1954).
48. Gooch v.Clark, 433 F.2d 74, 79 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 995
(1971). The court's conclusion conflicted with the result reached in Amalgamated
Meat Cutters v. Rogers, 186 F. Supp. 114 (D.D.C. 1960). Noting this conflict, the
court expressly disapproved of the holding in Rogers. Gooch v. Clark, 433 F.2d 74,
82 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 995 (1971).
49. Id. at 79. Basing its decision on Gooch, the INS held in In re Hoffman-Ar-

vayo, 13 I. & N. Dec. 750 (1971), that the term commuter encompasses the seasonal
commuter who enters to perform seasonal work for extended periods.
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by the INS may have been initially unlawful was not considered by the
court.50 The Gooch decision allowed the commuter system to remain un-

disturbed and the special treatment of commuters by the INS continued. 51
The commuter system was again challenged in the case of Bustos
v. Mitchell,5 2 decided by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
California and Texas farm workers brought suit challenging the legality of
the commuter system. Here, for the first time, a court drew a sharp distinction between seasonal and daily commuters.5 3 The court concluded that
the INS practice of classifying seasonal commuters as returning resident al50. Gooch v. Clark, 433 F.2d 74, 78 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 955
(1971). Since seasonal and daily commuters had already been admitted, the court concluded that they did not fall within the nonimmigrant category which excludes admission if "unemployed persons capable of performing such service or labor cannot be
found in this country . . . ." Id. at 78, quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)
(1970). Using logic which was not as clear as might be desired, the court insisted
that commuters could not be classified as nonimmigrants since "the same section would
"
classify commuters as nonimmigrants and simultaneously declassify them ....
Gooch v. Clark, 433 F.2d 74, 78(9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 955 (1971).
INS's failure to properly classify an alien does not pro tanto make his admission lawful.
See Bustos v. Mitchell, 481 F.2d 479, 484 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 42
U.S.L.W. 3400 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1974) (No. 300).
51. For instance, though a true resident alien may lose his status if absent longer
than I year, commuters are held to have conclusively abandoned their status if their
absence is longer than 6 months. In re Burciaga-Salcedo, 11 1. & N. Dec. 665 (1966);
In re M-D--S--, 8 1. & N. Dec. 209 (1958). Another such practice was found in
8 C.F.R. 211.1(b) (1972). It concerned the labor certification procedure which precluded commuters from entering the United States if there was a labor dispute at their
place of employment. The practice was struck down in San Andrews' Sons v. Mitchell, 457 F.2d 745, 749 (9th Cir. 1972). The court reasoned that the INS could not
place any legal significance on the fact that the commuter chose not to live in the
United States. The INS has, however, rteated commuters differently and this will undoubtedly cause conflicts in the future. Consider the following: In In re Moore, 13
I. & N. Dec. 711 (1971), the INS stated that the commuter status was merely an administratively created category established for the convenience of aliens living in Mexico or Canada but working in the United States whose every departure is a meaningful
one. Id. at 712-13. The commuter thereby subjects himself to possible exclusion upon
his return to the United States. In Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 463 (1963),
the Supreme Court held that an innocent, casual, and brief excursion by a resident
alien outside the United States may not have been intended as a departure disruptive of
his resident alien status and therefore may not subject him to the consequences of the
entry as if it were a first entry. In In re Hoffman-Arvayo, 13 I. & N. Dec. 750
(1971), the INS reiterated the contention that every departure of a commuter is a
meaningful one and cited Gooch. However, the court in Gooch stated:
At the time of a commuter's initial entrance into the United States, he would have
to comply with Section 1182(a)(14). But once such a lawful admittance occurred, the commuter could thereafter make regular entrances into the United
States as an immigrant "lawfully admitted for permanent residence, who is returning from a temporary visit abroad."
Gooch v. Clark, 433 F.2d 74, 81 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 955 (1971).
In light of Gooch and Sam Andrews' Sons, is the INS reasoning concerning meaningful departure faulty?
52. 481 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3400 (U.S. Jan.
14, 1974) (No. 300).
53. Id. at 481-82.
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ens had no statutory warrant and was thus illegal,5 4 citing as support the
lapse of the Bracero program and the tightening of controls by the labor certification procedure changes in 1965.55 It was determined that seasonal
commuters should instead be classified as nonimmigrants coming temporarily to the United States to perform temporary services. 5 6 Daily commuters,
on the other hand, do not perform temporary, but permanent, services and
thus do not come within the ambit of the nonimmigrant class. 57 In support
of its conclusion that the INS was not wrong in classifying daily commuters
as returning resident aliens, the court noted that this administrative practice
was known by Congress and had been utilized for over 45 years through
many different immigration statutes. The court felt that such a practice
should not be disturbed by the courts, but left to Congress. 58 Notice was
also taken of an affidavit filed by the Secretary of State59 to the effect that
an abrupt change in the daily commuter system would create hardships for
many people who have relied on the system for many years and a termination of such a longstanding administrative practice might strain relations between the United States, Canada and Mexico. 0
The significance of the Bustos decision is that the court acknowledged the
competing considerations inherent in any determination of the commuter issue. 61 On the one hand, the immigration laws were promulgated to protect
American labor from foreign job competition and on the other hand, it is
in the best interests of the United States to preserve amicable relations with
Mexico and Canada. In order to make a proper interpretation of the stattue, these factors must be recognized. Congress, and not the courts, however, must strike the balance between the two competing interests.
Congress has made its decision in a somewhat obtuse manner. Because
the Immigration and Nationality Act is not a paragon of clarity with respect
to commuters, the intention of Congress is not readily apparent. The analysis of the entire history of the commuter problem, however, reveals two
factors. First, it is clear that Congress has known of the existence of the
daily commuter system since General Order 86. The legislative history is
virtually silent-an "eloquent silence," in view of possible national and international repercussions that would follow from a termination of commuting. 62 It is also unlikely that Congress meant to end the daily commuter
system in the Immigration and Nationality Act by employing terminology
similar to that used by the INS prior to its enactment under which the com54. Id. at 484.

55. Id. at 482.
56. Id. at 483.

57. Id. at.484 & n.13.
58. Id. at 486.

59. Id at 487 n.26.
60. Id. at 487 n.26.
61. Id. at 487.
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muter system flourished.6 3 Second, it is equally clear that Congress intended,
by the lapse of the Bracero program and the change in the labor certification
procedure, to end the favored treatment accorded the seasonal commuter.64
It is only fair that the American farm worker be afforded the same protection as other groups now have under present immigration law.
One cannot gainsay that the actions of Congress have been deliberate. As
easily as the labor certification procedure was changed, legislation could
have been enacted to alter the definition of resident alien in such a way
as to eliminate commuters. It was not. In the final analysis, then, it would
seem that the Bustos decision, by upholding the administrative categorization
of daily commuters as resident aliens and declaring that seasonal commuters
must be classified as nonimmigrants coming temporarily to the United States
to perform temporary services, most closely follows the intent of Congress.
Thaddeus R. Lorentz
62. Gooch v. Clark, 433 F.2d 74, 80 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 955

(1971).

63. In re H-O-, 5 I. &N. Dec. 716, 718 (1954).

64. Bustos v. Mitchell, 481 F.2d 479, 482 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 42

U.S.L.W. 3400 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1974) (No. 300).
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